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Modern American industrial history is marked not only by the rise of large corporations and the professionalization of management (Chandler, 1977) but by the formulation of theories that minister to one of management's central problems: the control of complex organizations. Although managerial theories can be assessed as sets of propositions, they may also be treated as rhetorics or ideologies. By an ideology we mean a stream of discourse that promulgates, however unwittingly, a set of assumptions about the nature of the objects with which it deals. In this sense, all theories have an ideological component, since all theorists must adopt some ontological stance in order to proceed with their work. The objects of rhetorical construction in managerial theories have typically been corporations, employees, managers, and the means by which the latter can direct the other two.
Although some scholars have suggested that managerial theorizing has produced little more than a plethora of perspectives (Koontz, 1961), most have detected more orderly development. In what may still be the most influential study of managerial ideology, Bendix (1956) wrote of an increasing preoccupation with the social-psychological aspects of work. Bendix argued that rhetorics of social Darwinism typical of the nineteenth century had gradually but steadily given way to the belief that managers could better secure compliance by shaping workers' attitudes and sentiments. A number of managerial theorists have offered similar readings of managerial history (Scott, 1959; Wren, 1972) , as have some of management's most vociferous critics (Mills, 1951; Whyte, 1956; Edwards, 1979) . In fact, despite serious theoretical and political differences, scholars have converged on a common vision of how American managerial thought has evolved.
The dominant view posits a succession of phases (Jacoby, 1991 ) that parallels Etzioni's (1961) taxonomy of compliance and control. During the first phase, which ended in the late 1800s, managerial discourse sought to legitimate coercive shopfloor practices (Bendix, 1956; Nelson, 1975; Edwards, 1979) . The rhetoric of this early regime justified harsh discipline and even threats of violence by appealing to an individualistic ethic of success. By the turn of the century, early forms of mass production and a wave of corporate consolidations had set the stage for a second phase, during which utilitarian rhetorics became increasingly popular (Haber, 1964; Wren, 1972; Edwards, 1979) . Culminating in the work of Frederick Taylor, rational theories of management dominated managerial discourse by World War 1. The workforce was now said to be more effectively controlled by streamlining production processes and by appealing to the worker's self-interest. The Depression is widely held to mark the beginning of the third phase (Bendix, 1956; Wren, 1972) . As the white-collar labor force grew, managerial discourse began to emphasize normative control: the idea that managers could more effectively regulate workers by attending not only to their behavior but to their thoughts and emotions. By winning the hearts and minds of the workforce, managers could achieve the most subtle of all forms of control: moral authority. Although developments in managerial thought since the 1950s have yet to be rigorously analyzed, the recent explosion of interest in schemes for increasing employee loyalty and commitment are often read as evidence for the continuing vitality of the normative orientation that began with the human relations movement. Although the thesis of a progressive shift toward normative control has considerable elegance, it rests on a reading of history that underplays events in the late nineteenth century and that ignores streams of thought that gained prominence after World War I. Rectifying these oversights warrants a different interpretation of the historical record. Rather than having evolved linearly, managerial discourse appears to have alternated repeatedly between ideologies of normative and rational control. Table 1 summarizes our thesis. Nelson, 1975; Jacoby, 1991) . During the first half of the nineteenth century a handful of visionaries such as Robert Owen and James Montgomery wrote tracts espousing the ethos that would become known as "industrial betterment," and, later, "welfare capitalism" (Owen, 1813; Montgomery, 1832). However, industrialists largely ignored Owen's and Montgomery's message until the 1870s, when a generation of reformers popularized their work as part of a movement to alter industrial conditions. The movement consisted of a loose coalition of clergy, journalists, novelists, academics, and capitalists. Prominent among the early spokespersons was Washington Gladden, a Congregationalist minister who linked religious visions of morality to a "new stage of industrial evolution" premised on the "principle of co-operation" and characterized by "industrial partnerships" that would improve "the mental and moral qualities of the working-people" (Gladden, 1876: 44-50 Surge. The resurgence of welfare capitalism after World War I marked the rekindling of interest in normative control. However, the revival of welfare practices was not accompanied by a revival of the rhetoric that had legitimated the industrial betterment movement. Instead of the old themes of communalism and improved workingmen, the new rhetoric focused on entitlements and improved working conditions. For instance, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics' survey of welfare practices in 1919 concerned itself almost exclusively with vacations, sick leaves, health care, sanitation, and pension funds-topics we would now term employee benefits-rather than the social programs that attracted so much attention during the 1880s. More importantly, the report eschewed appeals to morality or duty in favor of appeals to efficiency, the watchword of scientific management. Thus the resurgence of welfare capitalism in the 1920s is best viewed as an attempt to modify and extend rationalism's promise to the realm of employment relations. The upshot was the birth of personnel administration (Jacoby, 1985) .
By 1920 not only had the National Personnel Association been formed but the National Civic Federation had begun to speak of "personnel directors" instead of "welfare secretaries" (Baritz, 1960 (1967) , and other contingency theorists proclaimed that the adequacy of an organization's structure depended on the specifics of its environment and technology. Furthermore, with an appropriately analytic orientation and knowledge of contingent relations, managers were led to believe that they could consciously design more effective firms by manipulating structures and decision processes (Galbraith, 1977) . Although most organizational theorists followed March and Simon (1958) in arguing that humans were boundedly rational and, hence, less omniscient than earlier rationalists presumed, the difference was one of degree. There might be no "one best way," as Taylor had proposed, but some ways were clearly better than others. Implicit in such theories was the notion that employees are instrumentally motivated and that efficiency is a of a broader trend that we dub "systems rationalism." Unlike earlier managerial rhetorics, systems rationalism had no titular spokesperson and lacked the character of an integrated movement. Instead, rhetorics of systems rationalism were articulated simultaneously by several camps that sometimes drew sharp distinctions between themselves. Nevertheless, the camps explicitly or implicitly subscribed to a set of precepts that transcended their differences.
As a group, systems rationalists expressed antipathy toward human relations. Odiorne (1965: 8) , for example, referred to the "human relations era" as the "age of the goof-off" and promised to move beyond fuzzy visions of a "sunny atmosphere" to practical action. Rhetoric. Culture's popularizers openly attacked systems rationalism. In the rush to adopt rational systems of control, firms were said to have sacrificed moral authority, social integration, quality, and flexibility. Although rationalization may have streamlined production, it was criticized for rewarding specialization, parochialism, and calculative involvement at the expense of loyalty and commitment. Culture's proponents claimed that rampant systematization posed few problems in a period of surplus and stability but that the costs of relying on systemic controls materialized when environments became turbulent. Critics argued that under such conditions exclusive reliance on rational controls might even exacerbate anomie to the point where further rationalization would actually occasion declines in productivity (Masuch, 1985) . that "unity" and "loyalty," the primary attributes of "strong" cultures, could counteract the unintended consequences of rational design. Because advocates of each envisioned cohesion and loyalty as the ultimate source of productivity, they exhorted managers to be leaders: to set an example, to inspire, to motivate, and to provide for the employees' welfare. As sentient, social beings, employees were said to perform more diligently when they were committed to a collective whose ideals they valued. Control therefore rested on shaping workers' identities, emotions, attitudes, and beliefs.
In contrast, the second set of rhetorics emphasized rational control. Proponents of scientific management and systems rationalism argued that productivity stemmed from carefully articulated methods and systems. Each portrayed the firm as a machine, either mechanical or computational, that could be analyzed into its component parts, modified, and reassembled into a more effective whole. Both rhetorics exhorted managers to be experts: to bring rational analysis and a body of empirical knowledge to bear on the firm's problems. Furthermore, both assumed that employees were calculative actors with instrumental orientations to work. Employees were said either to understand the economic advantages of an efficient system or to be powerless to resist a well-designed structure. Since compliance was therefore unproblematic, control could be readily exercised by manipulating systems.
The five rhetorics' sequence suggests an alternation between normative and rational ideologies of control. Although it is impossible to date ideological surges precisely, it seems safe to say that the normative rhetoric of industrial betterment captured the attention of prominent industrialists after 1870, when spokespersons first began to articulate the philosophy, and before 1900, when betterment practices had become sufficiently institutionalized to be showcased at an international exposition. Similarly, the rational rhetoric epitomized by scientific management moved beyond engineering circles to the larger managerial community between 1900 and the early 1920s (1933) , and Weber (1968) each sensed that industrialization was problematic because it juxtaposed two contrasting paradigms for social order. These two forms of social organization were given different names by different scholars. Weber wrote of the "communal" and the "associative," Durkheim contrasted "mechanistic" with "organic" solidarity, and Tonnies used "Gemeinschaft" and "Gesellschaft." However, the essence of their vision was the same. In a Gemeinschaft, people share a common identity, are bound by common values and traditions, and partake of a way of life that contrasts sharply with the competition, individualism, and calculative self-interest associated with Gesellschaft. The central dilemma identified by the early social theorists concerned the integrity of the social fabric. How could relations based on utilitarianism and rational calculation remain integrated and socially fulfilling? It seemed that increasing differentiation would beget crises of integration and that increasing integration would beget crises of differentiation.
The question of how to balance these opposing processes not only continues to motivate much sociological research, it appears to have become a central motif in Western culture.
Several anthropologists and sociologists have recently argued that all Western societies treat
traditionalism/rationalism and communalism/individualism dualistically (Eisenstadt, 1989; Abbott, 1990) . Associated with the antinomies' poles are opposing solutions to the problem of control: normative control and regimes of trust versus rational control and regimes of self-interest. For those who run corporations, this dualism often evinces itself in the practical issue of how to prevent anomie, construed as lack of commitment, while reaping the benefits of the very rationalization that exacerbates anomie. It should therefore come as no surprise that managerial ideologies traffic in notions of both normative and rational control. However, as structural anthropologists note, because cultural dualisms are ontologically incompatible, they can never be resolved even by the most cunning theory. All one can expect is to cope with the incommensurates.
After examining the anthropological literature on cultural dualism, Maybury-Lewis (1989) concluded that 'alternation" or "temporal segregation" is one of a small set of strategies by which societies have sought to manage incommensurates.3 Temporal segregation entails emphasizing alternate poles of an antinomy during successive time periods. Maybury-Lewis observed that alternation has been particularly prominent in Anglo-American cultures where, among other things, it underwrites the institution of two-party politics.
The trajectory of American managerial thought seems consistent with the Anglo-American pattern. One might therefore explain the alternation between rhetorics of normative and rational control as follows. Like most other people, managerial theorists are constrained by their culture's repertoire of images and ideas. As in most Western cultures, Anglo-American visions of social order rest on an opposition between mechanistic and organic solidarity, associated, respectively, with normative and rational ideologies of control. Thus, when constructing theories of how best to manage firms, theorists are more or less obliged to work within a broadly bipolar framework. Perhaps also for cultural reasons, American theorists have broached the duality of mechanical and organic solidarity by emphasizing either one or the other. But because the two visions form a duality, any ideology that emphasizes normative action is vulnerable to charges of ignoring rational action, and vice versa. Hence, temporal segregation offers an inherently unstable resolution. The instability may remain latent so long as the current ideology provides a plausible interpretation for events and so long as the managerial community appears to be coping reasonably well with socioeconomic conditions. However, when conditions change and the practices associated with the prevailing ideology seem to become inadequate, the cultural repertoire constrains theorists to search for alternatives nearer the pole of the antinomy least recently emphasized. Accordingly, managerial discourse evolves in alternating waves.
Although a theory of cultural constraint may be able to explain why the innovative edge of managerial discourse alternates between ideologies of normative and rational control, it cannot account for the timing of each new wave. , 1942, 1980, 1989 
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coincided with a period of increasing unionization and strike activity. Heightened labor activity may also have fanned interest in human relations during the 1940s. However, rhetorics of organizational culture and commitment unambiguously arose in an era of declining labor militancy. Moreover, of the two rational rhetorics, only systems rationalism surged during a period of labor calm. Scientific management moved beyond engineering circles as union foundings were reaching an all-time high and flowered when strikes were more common than at any previous time. Nevertheless, the labor-activity hypothesis remains elegant precisely because it relates the pattern of alternation to trends relevant to the substantive themes that distinguish between normative and rational ideologies of control. In fact, no contrast could be more prominent: Normative rhetorics stress the employee's relation to the firm, while rational rhetorics do not. The labor-activity hypothesis may therefore fail not because it emphasizes the wrong distinction but because it neglects to specify the distinction fully. The hypothesis frames the issue solely in terms of the tenor of the normative rhetorics. This one-sidedness directs attention to trends that may warrant an interest in normative control but not to trends that may warrant an interest in rational control. In effect, the labor-activity hypothesis assigns rational rhetorics to a residual category by claiming that they should surge whenever conditions do not merit normative appeals. The timing of normative and rational surges may be better explained by a process that would explicitly elicit normative rhetorics during certain times and rational rhetorics during others. Expansions and contractions of the economy may be such a process. Economic expansions and contractions. Rational and normative rhetorics both promise managers greater productivity and profitability but advocate radically different means for obtaining these ends. Rational rhetorics stress the efficient use of structures and technologies, while normative rhetorics stress employee relations. Therefore one might argue that rational rhetorics should surge when profitability seems most tightly linked to the management of capital. Conversely, normative rhetorics should surge when profitability seems to depend more on the management of labor. The literature on "Kondratieff cycles" or "economic longwaves" provides support for this line of reasoning. Students of longwaves contend that over the last 200 years Western economies have experienced four broad cycles of expansion and contraction, each with a period of approximately 50 years (Schumpeter, 1934; Kondratieff, 1935; Rostow, 1978; Mandel, 1980; van Duijn, 1983; Sterman, 1990) . Table 2 Depression, which some scholars locate before and others after World War 11. In either case, by the end of the war the West had entered a fourth expansion, which lasted through the 1960s. By the early 1970s Western economies had again embarked on a downturn, which has yet to end. Although evidence of longwaves can be found in economic data from most Western nations, the evidence is particularly strong for the United States (van Duijn, 1983). Several concluding clarifications and caveats are in order. First, to say that rational and normative ideologies of control have swept over managerial thought in alternating sequence is not to say that adherents of rational ideologies "outnumbered" adherents of normative ideologies in some eras but not others. Nor is it to say that rational and normative ideologies have alternately become "dominant," at least in the traditional sense of the term. In fact, there is considerable evidence that rational ideologies have always "dominated" the managerial community, in the sense that they are more prevalent and more tightly linked to managerial practice. For this reason we have been careful to avoid a language that might suggest the cyclical rise and fall of hegemonic regimes. Instead, in our view, the ideas, beliefs, and practices that inform the managerial community cluster around two broad themes: organic solidarity and rational control versus mechanical solidarity and normative control. The first cluster may be the larger (and perhaps more influential), but for both socioeconomic and cultural reasons, the second cluster periodically attracts considerable attention in the managerial community. This is not to say that rational theories disappear, nor even that rational thrusts do not also occur during normative eras, but only that rationalism will be tempered by and perhaps will even justify surges in normative theorizing. For instance, in the 1980s as the rhetoric of culture and commitment surged, the economy was overhauled by a wave of mergers and acquisitions justified in some managerial quarters by a hyperrational ideology of financial ruthlessness. Rather than cast doubt on our claim that this period was characterized by a surge of normative theorizing, the presence of this hyperrational ideology could be variously interpreted as the culmination, the continuation, or even the institutionalization of the previously surging rhetoric of systems rationalism. Ultimately, the power of any social-scientific theory lies not only in its capacity to explain the past but in its ability to predict the future. Ignoring social science's less than illustrious record of accurate predictions, if our analysis has merit, one would expect the current emphasis on normative control to be followed by a resurgence of rationalism. Moreover, this surge should occur in conjunction with a long-term expansion in the economy and the rise of a new paradigm of automation. The implications of such a suggestion for organization theory are sobering. Some believe that organizational theory develops progressively, while others believe that shifts in the tenor of our theorizing offer an opportunity for greater understanding. But to the degree that trends in organizational theory mirror trends in managerial discourse at large, our efforts may be neither cumulative nor pathbreaking. Instead, in the long run, the tenor of our theorizing may amount to little more than the turning of a small cog within a larger socioeconomic clock over which no one has control.
